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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent phenomenon in American competition policy is the
acquisition of a private firm by an enterprise that is either wholly owned by
government or in the midst of privatization. Such an acquisition poses the
question of how public ownership may alter the incentives of a firm to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. It also prompts one to examine the
process by which such altered incentives revert, as the level of government
ownership declines, to the same incentives that face purely private firms.
The competitive significance of partial privatization is increasingly
important as a matter of competition policy. The privatization, in Europe
and elsewhere, of government owned providers of telecommunications,
energy, transportation, and postal services is creating many new
corporations. These corporations each have billions of dollars to pursue
strategies of acquisition and entry into markets currently populated by
private firms. This Article focuses on the telecommunications industry, and
especially wireless telecommunications, because they are well down the road
of privatization and foreign direct investment.
American consumers gain from foreign direct investment in the U.S.
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telecommunications services market in at least three different ways. First,
foreign investment can increase competition in the market and thus improve
quality and decrease prices for American consumers.
Second, foreign direct investment increases the supply of capital in the
United States. That influx decreases the cost of capital for U.S. telecommu-
nications firms-particularly the riskier upstarts-and thus enables them to
fund greater levels of expansion and service enhancements than would be
possible in the presence of a higher cost of capital. A lower cost of capital
eventually works its way into lower prices, which again benefits U.S.
consumers.
Third, foreign direct investment may generate beneficial spillovers for
U.S. telecommunications firms. These benefits consist of the transfer of new
technology and management practices to U.S. firms and their workers.
Americans may be accustomed to thinking that U.S. firms are consistently in
the vanguard of new technologies, but in the case of wireless
telecommunications services, however, several other nations are more
advanced than the United States in terms of customer penetration and breadth
of service offerings. These spilloyers of technology and management
expertise benefit U.S. consumers.
There is no reason to believe that any of these significant benefits to
U.S. consumers from foreign investment would not accrue if the foreign firm
making the investment were still undergoing the process of privatization.
Each of these benefits is unrelated to the nature of the shareholders of the
investing company. Nevertheless, to date, the debate over acquisitions by
government owned enterprises has paid virtually no attention to the effect
of such acquisitions on consumer welfare maximization. Although the
welfare of consumers is universally understood to be relevant to
enforcement of antitrust law, the typical industry-specific statute, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Communications Act),' delegates vast
discretion to an independent agency authorized to advance the largely
undefined "public interest." In connection with its evaluation of an
application to transfer a license (which is necessary to any acquisition), the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has the authority to deny
any license transfer that would contradict its understanding of the public
interest. This standard is so elastic, at least in the minds of those currently
empowered to make decisions or influence policy, that it encompasses an
evaluation of the effects of the acquisition on the welfare of American
firms, with or without a corresponding evaluation of the acquisition's effect
on American consumers. Thus, in a manner reminiscent of U.S.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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antidumping law, the public interest analysis of acquisitions by firms that
are partially or wholly owned by a foreign government has taken on a
producer-welfare orientation.2 That orientation is also evident in the
legislative initiatives of the members of Congress most resistant to foreign
direct investment in the U.S. telecommunications industry.
This Article takes as given the unfortunate starting point that
consumer welfare is subordinated to producer welfare when evaluating the
competitive consequences of telecommunications acquisitions by partially
privatized firms. Given that unfortunate orientation, the challenge is to give
economic content to that producer-protection orientation in the manner
least deleterious to aggregate producer welfare in the United States. If we
are stuck with a producer-welfare standard, we should at least ensure that
no group of American producers is treated as more equal than another.
The 2000 acquisition of the American wireless telecommunications
firm VoiceStream Wireless by Deutsche Telekom AG of Germany supplies
the factual basis for developing this framework. The FCC approved the
acquisition in April 2001 and, in the process, embraced the economic
analysis that forms the basis for this Article.3 Despite its approval by the
FCC, the acquisition was vigorously opposed by the ranking Democrat on
the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South
Carolina.4 In May 2001, the Deutsche Telekom-VoiceStream transaction
also received U.S. government approval on national security grounds This
2. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating
Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (2000).
3. Applications of Voicestream Wireless Corp., Powertel, Inc., Transferors, and
Deutsche Telekom AG, Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and
Authorizations Pursuant to § 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Pursuant to § 310 of the Communications Act and Powertel, Inc.,
Transferor, and Voicestream Wireless Corp., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations Pursuant to § 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9779, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1089 (2001)
[hereinafter Deutsche Telekom Order].
4. See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, Deutsche Telekom Deal Wins FCC Votes, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 26, 2001, at B7 (discussing opposition of Senator Hollings on grounds that "the
combined company's backing by the German government would give it an unfair advantage
over American competitors such as AT&T Wireless Group .. ") When control of the
Senate shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats in May 2001, Senator Hollings
became chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. See Stephen Labaton, Senate Switch
Alters Outlook for Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Cl.
5. Press Release, Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Telekom Notes Completion of
CFIUS Review of Mergers (May 1, 2000), available at http:llwww.telekom.de/dtaglpresse/
artikel/0,1018,xl201,00.html. Acquisitions by foreign firns (whether or not in the process
of privatization) may raise national security considerations. See J. GREGORY SIDAK,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 109-10 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1997). There is no basis to suppose that, in the discharge of its duties under the Exon-Florio
Amendment, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") will fail
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Article will not address that topic.
Part II of this Article summarizes the legal analysis conducted by the
FCC in approving the license transfer application associated with Deutsche
Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream. After reviewing legislative history,
statutory language, and its own precedent, the FCC determined that section
310(a) of the Communications Act does not apply to indirect ownership of
a U.S. wireless communications licensee by a foreign government. Under
its analysis of section 310(b)(4),7 the FCC found no basis to overcome the
statute's rebuttable presumption that the proposed license transfer from
VoiceStream to Deutsche Telekom would serve the public interest. The
FCC explained that partial government ownership conferred no unique
advantages to Deutsche Telekom, found that the corporation lacked both
to identify true threats to American security that would arise from acquisitions by foreign
entities. See Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170
(1994)); 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (CFIUS regulations to implement Exon-Florio Amendment).
Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, the federal government may block any proposed
investment that appears to threaten national security. CEJUS makes that determination upon
request by a potential investor or a CFIUS agency. 50 U.S.C. § 2170(a) (1994).
Since the late 1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has played an
aggressive role in that national security process in acquisitions that have concerned the
telecommunications and information technology sectors. See Neil King, Jr. & David S.
Cloud, Global Phone Deals Face Scrutiny From New Source: the FBI, WALL ST. J., Aug.
24, 2000, at Al. This national security review of foreign investment appears to be
exhaustive. For instance, in connection with transactions such as British
Telecommunications' proposed acquisition of MCI in 1997, and Vodafone's acquisition of
AirTouch in 2000, the FBI required the parties to agree to a variety of conditions and
restrictions designed to ensure that foreign ownership of U.S. facilities would not impede
U.S. law enforcement or otherwise harm national security. The FBI continued its vigilance
in negotiations in connection with the acquisition of Verio, an Internet service provider, by
NTT Communications, a unit of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, in which the Japanese
government owned a majority interest. Id The NTr-Verio acquisition passed a thorough
investigation by the CFIUS agencies, which resulted in a committee recommendation to the
President that the transaction should be permitted to proceed. The President was satisfied
that any national security issues that may have been presented by the acquisition had been
resolved through these existing processes. Statement by the Press Secretary on Verio
Acquisition, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Aug. 23, 2000) available at
http://clinton6.nara.go v/2000/08/2000-08-23-statement-by-the-press-secretary-on-verio-
acquisition-html.
6. 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1994).
7. Id. § 310(b)(4) (Supp. V 1999). The statute states:
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed
radio station license shall be granted to or held by any corporation directly or
indirectly controlled by any other corporation of which more than one-fourth of
the capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by
a foreign government or representative thereof, or by any corporation organized
under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public
interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.
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the incentive and the ability to act anticompetitively in U.S.
communications markets and concluded that American consumers would
likely benefit from increased competition if the FCC approved the license
transfer.
Part III explains how economics can be used to predict, among
various constituents of U.S. producers, the likely winners and losers created
by Deutsche Telekom's investment in the U.S. telecommunications sector.
Part IV completes the analysis by examining an anticompetitive
hypothesis that could explain the predicted decline in the market value of
U.S. incumbent wireless carriers. That hypothesis, however, must be
rejected (and subsequently was rejected by the FCC) because Deutsche
Telekom cannot engage in predatory pricing and cross-subsidization in the
U.S. wireless telecommunications market. Deutsche Telekom does not
benefit from subsidized capital because of its partial government
ownership. Its bond ratings and weighted average cost of capital are
inconsistent with the credit-subsidization hypothesis. Moreover, Deutsche
Telekom does not have the opportunity to engage in predatory behavior
because: (1) Deutsche Telekom must pursue profit maximization, (2) its
fiduciary duties reinforce profit maximization, and (3) in Germany, it faces
competitive telecommunications markets as well as effective and
transparent regulation. Finally, Deutsche Telekom does not have the
incentive to engage in predatory behavior in the U.S. wireless
telecommunications market largely due to certain production characteristics
of the wireless telecommunications industry. In particular, the low variable
costs of wireless communications and the durability of spectrum ensure
that no predatory policy would pay off in the long term.
II. THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
In reviewing the license transfer application associated with Deutsche
Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream and Powertel, the FCC decided
several issues of first impression relating to a foreign acquirer that is in the
midst of privatization. The FCC considered, among other things, the
consumer benefits of upgrading and expanding existing networks, the lack
of unique advantages conferred by partial government ownership, and the
acquirer's lack of the ability and the incentive to conduct anticompetitive
price predation in U.S. markets. Furthermore, the FCC affirmed that, under
its 1997 Foreign Participation Order, acquirers from member countries of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") would receive preferential
treatment under a new "open entry" standard, such that they would receive
a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the foreign ownership
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restrictions in section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act, unless the
8FCC could show a "very high risk to competition" in a U.S. market. Under
the FCC's practice, the granting of a license or the approval of a license
transfer will generally be permitted, and the U.S. Trade Representative will
be trusted to ensure that market access for U.S. firms is possible in the
home market of the foreign investor.9
A. Statutory Interpretation of Sections 310(a) and (b)
Before applying the framework of the Foreign Participation Order to
Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream, the FCC evaluated the
transaction under section 310(d) of the Communications Act, as the agency
would any other transfer of a communications license.10 Section 310(d)
directs the FCC to analyze, under section 308, the applicants'
qualifications, requiring, among other things, the disclosure to the FCC of
certain financial and technical facts about the proposed licensee." Because
of its plans for network expansion, Deutsche Telekom also had to gain FCC
certification under section 214(a) because "the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or will require the construction" of
particular facilities. 2
After finding that Deutsche Telekom met basic qualification standards
to be the transferee of a license, the FCC conducted a detailed analysis of
sections 310(a) and (b).13 Specifically, the FCC had to decide whether
section 310(a) prohibits indirect ownership of a communications licensee
by a foreign government. If so, then the FCC would be precluded from
conducting a public interest analysis under section 310(b)(4).14 Senator
Hollings urged that section 310(a), rather than section 310(b)(4), should be
interpreted to apply to Deutsche Telekom and to prevent the license
transfer from VoiceStream to Deutsche Telekom.1
5
To weigh these arguments, the FCC examined the legislative history
8. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, paras. 51, 53 (citing Rules and Policies on
Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, Market Entry and Regulation
of Foreign Affiliated Entities, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12
F.C.C.R. 23,891, paras. 61-62, 113, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 750 (1997) (specifying
procedure for section 310(b)(4) filings)) [hereinafter Foreign Participation Order].
9. Id. para. 70.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994).
11. Id. § 308 (Supp. V 1999).
12. Id. § 214(a) (1994).
13. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, paras. 33-50.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1994).
15. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 38. Senator Hollings also argued that
Deutsche Telekom's acquisition should be denied under section 310(a) because, he alleged,
the corporation is a de facto representative of the German government. Id. para. 47 n.143.
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of section 310.16 Although it noted the possibility for ambiguity, the FCC
found that the statutory language strongly disfavored the interpretation that
indirect foreign ownership should be governed by both sections 310(a) and
310(b).' 8 The FCC said:
An interpretation of the statute that section 310(a) absolutely prohibits
indirect control of a licensee corporation under the structure described
in section 310(b)(4) therefore requires both reading section 310(a) to
cover a situation (indirect control) it does not expressly address, and
reading section 310(b)(4) not to cover a situation (ownership of a
holding company that also constitutes indirect control of the licensee)
that is within its express terms. 19
Previously, the FCC had rejected such an interpretation in dicta in several20
cases. The Commission conceded that one decision, Telekom Finland,
supported Senator Hollings's interpretation of section 310(a), but the
agency ruled that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
21majority of decisions. In short, relying on the plain language of section
310 as well as its own regulatory history, the FCC held that section 310(b)
applies exclusively to indirect foreign government investment in U.S.
telecommunications and that section 310(a) is inapplicable to such
investment.
22
16. Id. paras. 35-37, 46. The FCC considered the evolution of the Radio Acts of 1912
and 1927, the Communications Act of 1934, and its 1974 amendments that formed the basis
of the subsectional split of sections 310(a) and 310(b), and decided that Congress intended
the subsectional division to lessen the burden on potential foreign investors. Id. para. 37
n. 126 (citing S. REP. No. 93-795, at 1 (1974)). The FCC concluded: "The legislative history
reflects that this structural change was designed to lessen the burden on private radio
licensees and permit entities other than foreign governments and their representatives to
hold private radio licenses directly." Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 37.
17. Id. paras. 38, 45.
18. Id. paras. 39-40. The FCC also rejected the argument that Deutsche Telekom was a
de facto representative of the German government. Id. para. 47.
19. Id. para. 40.
20. Id. paras. 41-44; id. para. 40 n.131 (citing Pet. of Cable & Wireless, Inc.,
Declaratory Ruling and Memorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization and Certificate, 10
F.C.C.R. 13,177, paras. 11-23, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1007 (1995); App'n of GRC
Cablevision, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 47 F.C.C.2d 467, paras. 1-6, Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 827 (1974); App'n of Intelsat LLC, Memorandum, Opinion, Order and
Authorization, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,460, para. 48, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1077 (2000)).
21. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 44 (overruling any conflicting
interpretation of Telecom Finland, Ltd., Pet. for Determination of the Public Interest Under
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) to Permit LMDS and PCS Licensing, Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 17,648,
para. 7 (1997)).
22. Id.
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B. The Effects of the Foreign Participation Order on Section
310(b)(4)
The Foreign Participation Order, issued in 1997, changed how the
FCC decides cases concerning indirect license control by foreign entities,
including foreign companies in the midst of privatization. The order
expresses a liberalized policy toward allowing foreign ownership of U.S.
wireless licensees.
1. Displacing the ECO Test
Before its Foreign Participation Order, the FCC engaged in complex
market analyses to determine whether the home country of a foreign
investor allowed American investors reciprocal opportunities for
investment and market entry. That approach evolved into the Effective
Competitive Opportunities ("ECO") test.23 The high costs to both private
parties and the FCC of conducting that test surely deterred some measure
of foreign investment into U.S. communications markets. That cost led the
FCC to replace the ECO test with the Foreign Participation Order.24
The order created a rebuttable presumption for WTO member nations,
predicated on the notion that foreign investment into U.S. communications
markets should be encouraged whenever possible for its competitive
benefits.25 In discussing the applicability of the Foreign Participation
Order to the Deutsche Telekom-VoiceStream license transfer, the FCC
ruled: "In adopting this presumption as a factor in its public interest
analysis [under section 310(b)(4)], the Commission made no distinction
between government and private foreign ownership.' 26
2. Restoring the Burden of Proof
The FCC long regarded its discretion under section 310(b)(4) to be so
broad as to authorize the agency to reverse the burden of proof that
Congress specified. The FCC presumed foreign investment in an American
holding company exceeding 25% was unlawful, such that the applicant was
23. See id. para. 51 n.153 ('The ECO test required, as a condition of foreign carrier
entry into the U.S. market, that there be no legal or practical restrictions on U.S. carriers'
entry into the foreign carrer's market."). See also Market Entry and Reg. of Foreign-
Affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 3873, para. 6, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 459
(1995) [hereinafter Foreign Carrier Entry Order]; SIDAK, supra note 5, at 264-74.
24. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 8.
25. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 50. German competitors accused
Deutsche Telekom of anticompetitive conduct in the German market, but the FCC rejected
these complaints on the ground that it must defer to the USTR's conclusions to the contrary.
Id. paras. 67-70.
26. 1d. para. 51.
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required to prove to the FCC's satisfaction that the agency's grant of a
waiver of that putative ceiling on foreign ownership would affirmatively
serve the public interest in the applicant's particular facts and
circumstances. In PrimeMedia Broadcasting, Inc., for example, the FCC
succinctly and erroneously stated in 1988 that "alien equity interests in a
parent corporation... may only amount to 25%, unless the Commission
finds that the public interest would be served.
27
The Deutsche Telekom Order ended the FCC's longstanding
misreading of the plain language of this key subsection of the foreign
ownership restrictions in the Communications Act.2' By its plain language,
section 310(b)(4) allows foreign ownership of the holding company of a
communications licensee to exceed 25% but gives the FCC the discretion
to deny or withdraw the license "if the Commission finds that the public
interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.'29 A
treatise on international telecommunications regulation compiled by the
Federal Communications Bar Association in 1993 correctly stated that "the
onus is on the Commission to prove that the relaxed public interest
standard mandates a refusal of the license request."30 In 1995, the House
Commerce Committee agreed and chastised the FCC for its enduring
misinterpretation of section 31 0(b)(4). In its report accompanying H.R. 1555,
the Communications Act of 1995, the Committee noted that "the
Commission has consistently misinterpreted section 310(b)(4) by creating a
presumption that foreign investment is not in the public interest if it exceeds
25 percent of the equity of an American radio licensee. ' ,31 The Committee
further stated that pending proposed "amendments to section 310(b)... do
not constitute congressional acquiescence to the Commission's past
misinterpretation of section 310(b)(4)."32
In its order approving VoiceStream's transfer of licenses to Deutsche
Telekom, the FCC corrected its misinterpretation of section 310(b)(4) and
stated that Congress "barred the entities described in sections 310(a), (b)(1)
and (b)(2) from owning more than 25 percent of... a holding company
only if the FCC found such restrictions to be in the public interest in the
27. App'n of PrimeMedia Brdcst., Inc., for Construction Permits for New FM Facilities,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 4293, para. 12, 65 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 27
(1988) (emphasis added).
28. SIDAK, supra note 5, at 98-100.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (emphasis added).
30. Tara Kalagher Giunta, Foreign Participation in Telecommunications Projects, in 43
FED. COMMUN. BAR Ass'N INT'L PRACTICE COMM., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 1(b), para. 3 (Paul J. Berman & Ellen K. Snyder eds., 1993).
31. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 120-21 (1995).
32. Id. at 121.
[Vol. 54
PARTIALLY PR)VATIZED FIRMS
particular case., 33 With the circumlocution that only a regulatory agency
can supply, the FCC also said that "the language in section 310(b)(4)
permits the Commission, without implied limitation, to find that the public
interest would not be served by denying indirect foreign government
ownership that amounts to control of a licensee. ' 34 In plain English,
Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth confirmed that "today's decision
properly places the burden on the Commission, not the applicants, to show
that the 'public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such
license' transfer under section 3 10(b)(4). 35
3. Unique Risks of Government Ownership
Before examining specific markets, the FCC first asked whether, as a
general proposition, VoiceStream's proposed license transfer would give
Deutsche Telekom an anticompetitive advantage owing to its partial
government ownership. The FCC's analysis had two principal parts: one
concerning the consumer benefits expected to flow from the acquisition,
and the other concerning the greater likelihood of anticompetitive activity,
presumably in the form of price predation that the acquisition might
engender.
The FCC concluded that consumers would benefit from both
Deutsche Telekom' s extension of VoiceStream's existing
telecommunications network and from increased competition.36 The FCC
also found it highly unlikely that the proposed license transfer would result
in anticompetitive actions by Deutsche Telekom, notwithstanding that
various opponents of the acquisitions claimed that the transfer would give
VoiceStream a "virtually unlimited supply of capital" due to favorable
interest rate terms reflecting Deutsche Telekom's lower risk of default, or
through loan guarantees or special subsidies.37 As Part IV explains, and the
FCC agrees, however, an analysis of Deutsche Telekom's weighted
average cost of capital ('WACC") and bond ratings refutes this
hypothesis.38 The FCC determined that "the German government's
ownership of [Deutsche Telekom] does not confer unique financial
advantages or otherwise create a high risk to competition or consumers in
the United States that warrants special conditions." 39
33. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 36 (emphasis added).
34. Id. para. 48.
35. Id. (statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, concurring in part,
dissenting in part, para. 1 (citing SIDAK, supra note 5)).
36. Id. paras. 116-24.
37. Id. para. 60 (quoting comments from several exparte letters).
38. Id. paras. 63-64.
39. Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 59.
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4. Examining Specific U.S. Markets for a "Very High" Risk
The FCC also examined specific U.S. markets to determine whether
Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream would create a "very
high" risk of anticompetitive behavior. As Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth
observed, however, the FCC did "not engage in market analysis for market
analysis sake." 40 Rather, the analysis focused on specific complaints
brought before the FCC by competitors and others. Specifically, the FCC
sought, but did not find, evidence of very high risks in the U.S. mobile
telephony market and the U.S. international services market. The agency
also examined domestic issues regarding the global wireless market.
4
'
With respect to the U.S. mobile telephony and international services
markets, the FCC determined that there was not a very high risk of
anticompetitive behavior because, after the proposed license transfer,
Deutsche Telekom still would lack both the ability and the incentive to
engage in predatory behavior directed at U.S. competitors. In finding that
Deutsche Telekom lacked the ability to engage in anticompetitive behavior,
the FCC reiterated the lack of any unique advantage conferred by Deutsche
Telekom's partial government ownership, as well as Deutsche Telekom's
legal duties as a public corporation to German regulatory agencies and
shareholders. The FCC also noted the impossibility of Deutsche
Telekom's price predation against American wireless carriers, given
VoiceStream's small market share relative to competitors that have vast
capital resources. In finding that Deutsche Telekom lacked the incentive
to act anticompetitively, the FCC reasoned that it would be irrational for
Deutsche Telekom to incur predatory losses to gain temporary control over
wireless communications only to have the FCC reallocate the spectrum of
bankrupt rivals a short time thereafter."
Finally, the FCC determined that there is not a very high risk of
anticompetitive problems with respect to certain domestic issues regarding
Deutsche Telekom's move to gain more control over the global wireless
market-that is, to gain a bigger global "footprint."45 The FCC reasoned
that the advantages of scale inherent in such activity should be encouraged
40. Id. para. 3 (statement of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth, concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
41. Id. paras. 45-64.
42. Id. paras. 78-99. The FCC also noted the role of dominant carrier safeguards in
Germany, which require strict accounting standards for Deutsche Telekom's long-distance
service. Id. paras. 100-02.
43. Id. paras. 89, 98-99.
44. Id. para. 90.
45. Id. para. 113.
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as a normal competitive development within a high-technology industry.46
III. PREDICTED PRODUCER HARM FROM FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
When Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream was
announced, one might have predicted that an invigorated VoiceStream,
with access to Deutsche Telekom's technology, expertise, and resources,
would increase competition in the provision of wireless services in the
United States. Consumers benefit from increased competition in the form
of improved services, lower prices, or both. In addition, one might have
predicted that the U.S. Treasury would benefit from VoiceStream's ability
to compete more effectively in future spectrum auctions as the company
sought to complete the footprint necessary to offer truly national service.
Some might argue that the benefits to U.S. consumer welfare from
investment by companies with foreign government partial ownership come
at the expense of U.S. companies. Put in economic terms, do the gains in
consumer welfare come at the expense of producer welfare? To begin to
answer that question, one must immediately ask two more. First, which
constituencies of American producers benefit or suffer from the foreign
investment in question? Second, if a particular constituency of American
producers suffers as a result of the foreign investment, is that harm
something from which those producers have a legal right to be protected?
With respect to the acquisition of VoiceStream by Deutsche Telekom,
one could predict that four identifiable constituencies of producers would
be affected by the transaction. Three clearly would benefit. The fourth
would not, but for reasons that should not raise policy concerns.
First, VoiceStream and its shareholders obviously would be expected
to benefit from Deutsche Telekom's acquisition the same is true of
Powertel and other wireless carriers that use the GSM standard. Voice-
Stream would be a more effective competitor, and the increased value of
the company is reflected in the premium that Deutsche Telekom offered to
pay over VoiceStream's previous market price.
Second, American companies that are major users of wireless
telecommunications services would be expected to benefit from the
acquisition of VoiceStream by Deutsche Telekom because, as explained
above, the transaction would intensify competition over price, quality, and
service innovations. For these firms, the cost of an important input would
fall and the quality of service would rise.
Third, U.S. manufacturers of telecommunications equipment would
46. Id. paras. 113-14.
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benefit from Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream. An
acquisition that leads to lower prices and raises output of wireless services
in turn increases the demand for complementary equipment, including
handsets, base stations, switches, and the like. Incidentally, the expanded
demand for telecommunications equipment is a good proxy for consumer-
welfare effects in the telecommunications services market.
Fourth, one would predict that incumbent wireless carriers in the
United States would suffer from Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of
VoiceStream. The predicted competitive effects on incumbent wireless
carriers come from two distinct sources. The incumbents would face more
competition for customers and thus face downward pressure on prices. In
addition, in future spectrum auctions, the incumbents would confront a
more robust bidder and thus face upward pressure on the amounts that they
must pay the U.S. Treasury for spectrum. Neither of those results, however,
is one that the incumbent U.S. wireless companies have standing to
complain about. Both effects flow from more vigorous competition.
IV. COULD THE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON INCUMBENT WIRELESS
CARRIERS RESULT FROM ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR?
Consider the main question that Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of
VoiceStream presented: Could losses to U.S. incumbent wireless carriers
result not from greater competition, but from anticompetitive behavior that
is unique to an entrant with partial government ownership? It is a subtle
economic question whether a firm having a government owner has
different incentives from those of a wholly private firm. The scholarly
literature in economics and law contains virtually no published analysis of
this question. Along with Professor David Sappington, this Author has
analyzed the competitive incentives of government enterprises. The
analysis assumed, however, that the public enterprise was 100% owned and
controlled by a government entity.
Regulators and antitrust authorities in the United States might have
the following competitive concerns about a firm wholly owned by a foreign
government entity. First, the bonds of the firm might be backed, explicitly
or implicitly, by the full faith and credit of the foreign government, thus
allowing the firm to borrow more than a similar company facing the
prospect of failure. Consequently, the firm might enjoy an artificially low
cost of capital relative to totally private firms. Second, the government
owned firm might cause the regulator in the firm's home market to be
lenient toward the firm. As a consequence, the foreign market may not be
open to competition, such that the government owned firm might be able to
cross-subsidize its entry into the U.S. market with supracompetitive pricing
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at home.
As this analysis has emphasized, the absence of profit maximization
is the critical factor for a public enterprise in terms of its predatory
incentives. Conversely, profit maximization becomes the requisite
objective of a firm as soon as it is at least partly privatized and listed on a
stock exchange. This caveat is directly relevant to Deutsche Telekom.
Moreover for other reasons, the concerns about predation do not fit the
facts of Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream. Consider first the
argument about government subsidization of capital.
A. Does the Foreign Acquirer Benefit from Subsidized Capital?
Deutsche Telekom's debt is not backed, explicitly or implicitly, by
the full faith and credit of the German government. Deutsche Telekom does
not benefit from any preferential conditions regarding access to capital,
such as government guarantees. After January 2, 1995, the date of
Deutsche Telekom's registration in Germany's Commercial Register,
liabilities incurred were no longer guaranteed by the Federal Republic of
Germany.47 Further evidence that Deutsche Telekom does not have a
subsidized cost of capital is found in Deutsche Telekom's credit rating.
1. Bond Ratings
Deutsche Telekom's bond ratings refute the hypothesis that the
company has subsidized capital. As Table 1 indicates, in January 2001
(during the pendency of VoiceStream's license transfer application), the
German government was rated at the highest possible Standard & Poor's
rating of AAA. At the same time, Deutsche Telekom had a significantly
lower Standard & Poor's rating of A-. As of August 2000, Deutsche
Telekom's credit ratings had been higher, at AA2 (Moody's) and AA-
(Standard & Poor's). At the conclusion of the 3G spectrum auction in
Germany in August 2000, Deutsche Telekom's credit rating was
481downgraded.
47. Deutsche Telekom AG, PROSPECTUS FOR 200 MILLION ORDINARY SHARES IN THE
FORM OF SHARES OR AMERICAN DEPOSITARY SHARES, June 17, 2000, at 23, available at
http://www.telekom.detenglish/company/linv-rel/gesch-zahlen/geschaeft/download/prospect
usOO.pdf [hereinafter DEUTSCHE TELEKOM PROSPECTUS].
48. German '3G' Winners Take Hit from Credit Rating Agency S&P, German 3G
Spectrum Auction Tops U.K Bidding Total by $10 Billion, TELECOMM. REP. DAILY, Aug.
21, 2000, available at http:/www.tr.com/online/trd/2000/td0817OOTdO8l7OO-O.l.htm
(discussing how S&P analysts planned to downgrade the credit ratings of Dutch carrier KPN
NV, British Telecommunications PLC, and Deutsche Telekom AG within two weeks of the
auction's close); see also Edmund L. Andrews, $50 Billion for German Wireless Licenses,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2000, at C4.
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TABLE 1: Credit Ratings for Selected Global Telecommunications
Companies, January 2001
Standard & Poor's
Carrier or Government Rang Moody's Ratingating
German Government AAA Aaa
SBC Communications AA- Aa3
Verizon Communications A+ Al
British Telecom* A A2
AT&T Corp.'" A A2
Deutsche Telekorn A- A2
WorldCom Inc.* A- A3
Sources: Standard & Poor's ratings obtained from Standard & Poor's New York Ratings
Desk on Jan. 2, 2001. Moody's ratings obtained from Moody's New York Rating Desk on
Jan. 2, 2001.
Notes: *Standard & Poor's: Negative outlook. **Standard & Poor's: Negative credit watch.
Moody's: On watch for possible downgrade.
Deutsche Telekom's credit rating in January 2001 not only was
significantly lower than the German government's credit rating, but also
was below or comparable with the credit ratings of private
telecommunications firms in the United States and Europe. Deutsche
Telekom's bond rating was below that of SBC, Verizon, British Telecom,
and AT&T, and comparable with the bond rating of WorldCom. Deutsche
Telekom's credit rating is therefore inconsistent with the hypothesis that it
receives a credit subsidy from the German government. The FCC expressly
relied on this credit rating evidence in its April 2001 order approving
Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream.49
2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital
One can also use a weighted average cost of capital analysis to
evaluate the hypothesis that Deutsche Telekom has preferential access to
capital by virtue of its partial ownership by the government. The results of
this analysis also refute the credit subsidization hypothesis.
A firm's WACC is the expected return on a portfolio of all the firm's
securities."' The formula for WACC is simply a weighted average of the
return on equity and the return on debt: WACC = (D/V)rD(l-t) + (E/V)rE,
49. See Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 64.
50. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 457 (5th ed. 1996).
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where D is the firm's outstanding debt, E is the market capitalization of the
firm's equity, V is the sum of the firm's outstanding debt (D) and the
market capitalization of the firm's equity (E), rD is the firm's average
borrowing rate, r, is the firm's return on equity, and t is the corporate
income tax rate. To estimate the firm's return on equity, the Author uses
52the capital asset pricing model .
To determine whether Deutsche Telekom has preferential access to
capital, the Author computes the weighted average cost of capital for
Deutsche Telekom and other telecommunications operators. If Deutsche
Telekom's WACC is not significantly less than the WACC of its global
competitors, then one must reject the hypothesis that Deutsche Telekom
has the opportunity to engage in predatory tactics in the United States by
virtue of its (supposedly) preferential access to capital due to its partial
government ownership. In actuality, Deutsche Telekom's cost of capital is,
as Table 2 shows, higher than that of SBC, Sprint, AT&T, Verizon, and
BellSouth and is roughly equal to British Telecom's cost of capital 3 The
FCC embraced this WACC analysis in its order approving Deutsche
Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream. 4
51. Id. at 458. The Author uses the tax rate of the country that hosts the parent
company. For Deutsche Telekom, the Author used the corporate tax rate of Germany, which
is 31.65%. See DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT at 72 (2000), available at
http://www.telekom.de/engHish/company/invregeschzahlen/geschaeftl99/download/2f.pdf
[hereinafter DEUTSCHE TELEKOM ANNUAL REPORT] According to Deutsche Telekom:
German corporations are subject to corporate income tax at a rate of 40 percent on
non-distributed profits and of 30 percent on distributed profits. The corporate
income tax liability is subject to a 5.5 percent solidarity surcharge
(Solidarititszuschlag). This results in an effective aggregate charge of 31.65
percent on distributed profits.
Id. When calculating the WACC for foreign companies, it is important for consistency to
use betas and risk premiums based on the same markets. In Deutsche Telekom's case, one
could use either a beta based on a U.S. market index with the U.S. market risk premium, or
a beta based on a German market index with the German market risk premium. Using the
beta from one market and the risk premium from another will bias the WACC calculation
upwards or downwards. The Author uses betas based on the S&P 500 (taken from
NASDAQ's web site, available at http://www.nasdaq.com) in conjunction with the U.S. risk
premium when calculating WACCs for all the firms, foreign and domestic, in the sample.
52. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 50, at 180.
53. See Deutsche Telekon Order, supra note 3, para. 63.
54. See id.
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TABLE 2: Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WA CC) for Major
Telecommunications Companies
Weighted Average Government
Rank Company Cost of Capital Ownership
1 Telmex 15.7 0.0%
2 Qwest 15.7 0.0%
3 Worldcom 13.5 0.0%
4 Vodafone 13.3 0.0%
5 France T616com 13.0 63.6%
6 Telecom Italia 11.9 3.46%
7 British Telecom 11.9 0.2%
8 Deutsche Telekom 11.7 58.2%
9 Bell Canada 11.7 0.0%
10 SBC 10.8 0.0% 0
11 Sprint 10.1 0.0%
12 Telef6nica 9.9 0.0%
13 AT&T 9.8 0.0%
14 Verizon 8.7 0.0%
15 BellSouth 8.6 0.0%
16 Telstra 8.2 50.1%
17 NTT 7.9 53.2%
18 KPN 7.5 43.0%
19 Eircom 7.4 1.1%
20 Felecom New Zealand 7.2 0.0%
I A__verage 10.7
Sources: Market risk premium from BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 50, at 146. Risk-free
rate is the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate on December 15, 2000, downloaded
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Web site at http://research.frbchi.org. Betas
downloaded from http://www.nasdaq.com. Debt borrowing rates, value of debt (which
includes current maturities), corporate income tax rates, and shares outstanding taken from,
or calculated on the basis of, data from companies' annual reports and publicly available
SEC documents. Market prices per share downloaded on January 2, 2001 from various stock
exchanges' Web sites and http://finance.yahoo.com/?u.
Note: Classes of non-traded common stock are not included in the market value of current
outstanding equity.
In short, the theoretical argument that a firm with partial government
ownership might have access to subsidized capital does not accurately
describe Deutsche Telekom. At the time of its acquisition of VoiceStream,
Deutsche Telekom's cost of capital was virtually the same as that of France
T6l6com, a company with a greater level of government ownership, and
that of British Telecom, a company with no appreciable government
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ownership. Clearly, partial government ownership does not determine the
cost of capital for global telecommunications carriers.
3. Statutory Privileges or Immunities
In addition to the fact that it does not have preferential access to
capital, Deutsche Telekom is a private law stock corporation subject to
applicable German federal law, such as the German Stock Corporation Act
and German tax laws. 5 Thus, Deutsche Telekom has the same
responsibilities (for example, with regard to taxation) as any other private
enterprise in Germany and does not enjoy tax benefits or any kind of
preferential tax treatment. 6 Equally, Deutsche Telekom does not receive
state aid, as European Union legislation prohibits state aid that would
distort competition. 7
B. Can the Foreign Acquirer Engage in Predatory Pricing and
Cross-Subsidization in the U.S. Wireless Telecommunications
Market?
A fundamental difference exists between a company with domestic
government ownership and a company with foreign government ownership.
Plainly, the former is a greater threat to competition than is the latter. For
example, predation and cross-subsidization by the U.S. Postal Service in
the American overnight mail or parcel delivery market is plausible given
that the Postal Service is 100% government owned with no realistic
prospect of privatization in the near future, that it enjoys a statutory
monopoly over both the delivery of letters and access to the customer's
letter box, and that it is subject to relatively light-handed regulation by the
Postal Rate Commission.58 The same is true of Deutsche Post and the
German parcel delivery market, as the European Commission ruled in
March 2001, when it found Deutsche Post to have engaged in predatory
pricing in violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. 59 If particular members
of Congress seek to prevent possible competitive abuses by government-
owned enterprises, there is much that can be done first by scrutinizing the
55. See DEUTSCHE TELEKOM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 72-74.
56. See id.
57. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 211 (1997).
58. See generally J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING COMPETITION
FROM THE POSTAL MONOPOLY (1996).
59. Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 20010.J. (L 125) 27 (holding Deutsche
Post liable for predatory pricing of parcel delivery services in Germany and ordering
structural separation).
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businesses that the U.S. government itself wholly owns and operates
behind the protection of statutory monopolies and other privileges and
immunities.
In contrast to the plausible anticompetitive behavior in domestic
markets by public enterprises such as the U.S. Postal Service or Deutsche
Post (before its initial public offering), predation and cross-subsidization by
Deutsche Telekom in the American market for wireless
telecommunications services is highly implausible. A critical assumption of
the cross-subsidy argument is that Deutsche Telekom would use cross-
subsidies to obtain a temporary competitive advantage over its rivals in the
U.S. wireless market, with the objective of eliminating competitors. That
view implies that Deutsche Telekom would engage in behavior resembling
predatory pricing, which is said to occur when a firm incurs a loss with the
intention of eliminating rivals and later raising prices to supracompetitive
levels to recoup earnings after the rivals have exited the market.60 That
argument has been widely discredited. The published economics literature
and the Supreme Court generally agree that predatory pricing is unlikely to
succeed because: (1) there is little guarantee of successful recoupment; (2)
rivals can also incur losses in anticipation of future profits; and (3) new
entrants will appear if prices are raised after the existing competitors have
exited the industry.61 Moreover it is difficult in practice to distinguish low
competitive prices from predatory prices and to distinguish low earnings
62from predatory losses.
In the following sections, I apply the traditional theory on predatory
behavior to demonstrate that Deutsche Telekom does not have either the
opportunity or the incentive to engage in predatory behavior in the U.S.
wireless telecommunications market. The German government's partial
ownership of Deutsche Telekom during the remaining period of the
company's privatization does not create any special concern in this regard.
1. Ability to Engage in Predatory Behavior
Deutsche Telekom does not have the ability to engage in predatory
60. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN
LOCAL TELEPHONY 63 (1994); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 475-76
(1989); see generally JOHN R. Lorr JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?: WHO
SHOULD THE COURTS BELIEVE? (1999).
61. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-
26 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144-59 (Free
Press 1993) (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
184-96 (1976).
62. BORK, supra note 61, at 144-55.
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behavior in the U.S. wireless telecommunications market for at least three
basic reasons. First, Deutsche Telekom is compelled to pursue long-run
profit maximization, which is inconsistent with predatory pricing. Second,
fiduciary duties reinforce Deutsche Telekom's dedication to profit-
maximizing behavior. Third, the German telecommunications market is
sufficiently competitive to deny Deutsche Telekom any reservoir of
supracompetitive profits from which it might pay for a strategy of predation
in the U.S. wireless telecommunications market.
a. The Obligation to Pursue Profit Maximization and the
Reinforcing Effect of Fiduciary Duties
The absence of long-run profit maximization is the critical factor
behind the theory that a public enterprise will have a heightened incentive
for predatory conduct.63 But profit maximization necessarily becomes the
objective of a firm as soon as it is at least partly privatized and listed on a
stock exchange. (The same is not true of the U.S. Postal Service, for
example, which is wholly owned by the U.S. government and thus has no
shares publicly traded on a stock exchange).6
This insight has critical implications for the competitive analysis of
the partial government ownership of Deutsche Telekom; that partial
government ownership does not relieve Deutsche Telekom from the
objective of profit maximization. Because Deutsche Telekom must
compete with other firms for capital, Deutsche Telekom is not free to
choose predatory prices (or any other prices) that do not maximize long-run
profits, and hence returns to investors. In short, because Deutsche Telekom
is a publicly traded company, it must seek to maximize profit.
It is, of course, a fundamental principle of corporate law that the
majority shareholder of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to
minority shareholders.6' Even though Deutsche Telekom is a German
corporation, its securities trade on not only the Frankfurt and London
exchanges, but also on the New York Stock Exchange. As of January 2001,
63. See LoT, supra note 60; David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Are Public
Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 271 (2000); DAVID E.M.
SAPPINGTON & J. GREGORY SIDAK, INCENTIVES FOR ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR BY PUBLIC
ENTERPISES (AEI-Brookimngs Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-
11, 1999).
64. See SIDAK& SPULBER, supra note 58.
65. See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969). For an
insightful analysis of the applicability of fiduciary duties to public enterprises, see Michael
J. Whincop, Another Side of Accountability: The Fiduciary Concept and Rent-seeking in
Government Corporations, Social Science Research Network, at http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.tafabstract_id=258668 (Nov. 2000).
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nearly 20% of Deutsche Telekom's stock was held by U.S. individual and
66institutional investors. If, as majority shareholders of Deutsche Telekom,
the German government and the Kreditanstalt fir Wiederaufbau (the
German reconstruction bank, founded pursuant to the Marshall Plan)
attempted to influence the management of Deutsche Telekom to deviate
from profit-maximizing behavior, and if Deutsche Telekom acquiesced to
that attempt, Deutsche Telekom would expose itself, under American
corporate law, to liability to the company's minority shareholders. Similar
risks of liability could arise for Deutsche Telekom under the laws of other
nations with respect to the rights of Deutsche Telekom shareholders in
those nations.
Given the highly developed market for shareholder litigation in the
United States, these various fiduciary duties are powerful incentives to
keep the current majority shareholders of Deutsche Telekom inclined
toward profit maximization. That legal duty accords with good business
sense. Deutsche Telekom is in the midst of privatization. Plainly, to ensure
successful share offerings in the future, the Kreditanstalt fir Wiederaufbau
and the German finance ministry have a powerful incentive to see that
Deutsche Telekom delivers maximum value to its current shareholders,
which is an objective that cannot be reconciled with a strategy of incurring
predatory losses in new markets.
b. Competition and Regulation in the Acquirer's Home Market
The ability to engage in predatory behavior in the United States also
depends on whether, in its home market, the foreign acquirer faces
competitive telecommunications markets and effective, transparent
regulation. In Deutsche Telekom's case, the regulatory and competitive
conditions of the German wireless and traditional landline
telecommunications markets do not provide Deutsche Telekom
supracompetitive returns with which to subsidize predatory behavior in the
U.S. mobile telephony market.
The German telecommunications market was fully liberalized on
January 1, 1998. Because there are no foreign ownership restrictions in
Germany, many foreign-owned companies have entered the market. The
German Regulatory Authority reported that "[b]y the end of 1999, 252
66. The factual discussion over the following pages draws from my September 2000
congressional testimony and the sources cited therein. See Foreign Government Ownership
of American Telecommr Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade,
and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 101 et seq. (2000)
[hereinafter Testimony of J. Gregory Sidak].
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companies had been granted a network or a voice telephony licence., 67 As
of March 2000, over 100 companies offered voice telephony, including
more than forty resellers.6' Foreign companies, half of which are from
69North America, held majority stakes in 20% of these licensees. In satellite
communications, over 30% of the licenses (nineteen of fifty-nine) had been
awarded to foreign companies. 70
The pace of telecommunications deregulation in Germany since its
landmark legislation in 1996 compares favorably with that in the United
States. Although interconnection disputes arise in Germany and produce
court cases, the same is true in the United States where the Supreme Court
has twice heard cases concerning the unbundling and interconnections rules
applicable to incumbent local exchange carriers under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.71 In the German long-distance market, as
Figure 1 shows, the decline in Deutsche Telekom's market share following
privatization has occurred much more rapidly than the decline that occurred
in AT&T's market share following its divestiture. AT&T's share of
operating revenues fell from 91% to 45% during the thirteen-year period
from 1984 to 1997, whereas Deutsche Telekom's market share fell from
100% to approximately 60% in only a two-year period from year-end 1997
to year-end 1999.
67. REGULATORY AuTrORITY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTS, ANNUAL REPORT
1999, at 13 (2000), available at http://www.regtp.de/en/marketstartfs_15.html.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id.
71. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
121 S. Ct. 877 (2001).
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FIGURE 1: Decline in Long-Distance Market Share for AT&T and
Deutsche Telekom
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Notes: AT&T's share of total access minutes, which includes international minutes, for all
U.S. long-distance carriers. Deutsche Telekom's share of domestic long-distance,
international, and fixed-to-mobile minutes.
Sources: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS DIVIsIoN, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, Table 10.1, July 1998, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommoinCarrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/IAD/trend298.pdf;
REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at
14 (2000), at http://www.regtp.de/en/market/start/fs_15.html; Telekom Announces
Aggressive Price Policy, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 19, 1998, at 21.
Indeed, most market segments of the German telecommunications
market are already subject to vigorous price competition, which eliminates
any chance of excessive pricing from which to earn monopoly rents. With
respect to the local market, Deutsche Telekom is required to provide
competitors with unbundled access to its subscriber access lines, and the
Regulatory Authority has set a monthly tariff for this unbundled access that
is substantially lower than that sought by Deutsche Telekom in its tariff
application.
With respect to unbundled network access, the U.S. incumbent local
exchange carriers are obliged to provide unbundled access to the local loop.
The access price is set by state regulators, and it varies by state. Using a
three-state average of states with similar population density to Germany-
New York, Delaware, and Massachusetts-the monthly local loop rate is
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72$14.96, or DM 29.92. The tariff for a digitally capable loop, however, can
be almost twice as expensive as the tariff for an analog loop. By
comparison, Deutsche Telekom is obliged to provide unbundled access to
the local loop at DM 25.40 per month, or 15.1% less than the U.S. rate.
Moreover, in Germany, all loops are digitally capable. Thus, while the
price of an analog loop in Germany is similar to an analog loop in the
United States, the price of a digital loop in Germany is roughly half the
price of one in the United States.
In the national market, the terms on which Deutsche Telekom
provides services to competitors are essentially determined by the
Regulatory Authority. The interconnection rates charged by Deutsche
Telekom during 1999 were set by the Ministry for Posts and
Telecommunications, the predecessor to the Regulatory Authority, in
September 1997. In December 1999, the Regulatory Authority approved
new interconnection rates that, applied through January 31, 2001, were on
average approximately 24% lower than the previously applicable
interconnection rates. The terms for interconnection of Deutsche Telekom's
telephone network with networks of other national providers are contained
in bilateral contracts. At the end of 1999, Deutsche Telekom had signed
ninety-five such agreements. An additional fifty companies had submitted
requests for negotiations at that date. The total number of leased lines
provided to carriers at year's end (that is, transmission paths that had been
made available to competitors in the fixed-line network) rose by 43% in
731999 in comparison with the previous year.
In the German wireless market, Deutsche Telekom ranks second
behind the market leader, Vodafone. The wireless market opened to
competition earlier than the wireline market. Four mobile network
operators served Germany as of early 2001. The two largest, T-Mobil (T-
D1/T-C-Tel) and Mannesmann Mobilfunk (D2), have battled for market
leadership since 1990, with D2 currently having a modest edge. Between
them, they serve approximately 79.9% of the digital mobile
telecommunications market in Germany, based on management estimates,
with T-Mobil having an estimated share of 39% of this market as of
December 31, 1999. E-Plus, the third mobile network operator, entered the
market using the GSM 1800 standard in 1994, two years after T-D1 and D2
commenced operations, and held an estimated 16.3% of the market at year-
end 1999. E2, the fourth network operator, commenced operations in late
1998 also using the GSM 1800 standard and in 2000 had an estimated
market share of 3.9%. Licenses for UMTS-or third-generation mobile
72. Testimony of J. Gregory Sidak, supra note 66.
73. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 49.
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telecommunications-were auctioned in Germany during the summer of
2000. The auction generated six distinct licensees-the four incumbent
wireless carriers plus two entrant carriers backed by France Te61com and
by Spain's Telef6nica and Finland's Sonera. Now Deutsche Telekom must
compete for wireless customers against VIAG Interkom (backed by British
Telecom), MobilCom Multimedia (backed by France Telrcom),
Mannesmann MobilFunk (Vodafone), Group 3G (a joint venture between
Telef6nica and Sonera), and KPN's E-Plus Hutchison. 74 Some analysts
expect that the six distinct licensees will produce "fierce competition" in
the German wireless market, making "it more difficult for 3G operators to
recoup their license costs.
' 75
The large number of experienced companies that have entered, and
continue to enter, all segments of the German telecommunication market
ensures that prices in Germany are driven close to competitive levels. That
outcome in turn ensures that Deutsche Telekom cannot earn
supracompetitive returns with which to fund a predatory strategy in another
country. The competitive entry witnessed in the German
telecommunication market also indicates that entrants there do not fear
cross-subsidization by Deutsche Telekom. Otherwise, for example, firms
other than Deutsche Telekom would not have spent $38.5 billion ($46.2
billion total, less $7.7 billion paid by Deutsche Telekom) in August 2000 to
acquire licenses for 3G spectrum.76 For these reasons, it is also highly
improbable that, outside Deutsche Telekom's home market, Deutsche
Telekom would pose any actual risk of cross-subsidization or be believed
by competitors in those other countries to pose any such risk. No evidence
exists that Deutsche Telekom has engaged in predatory behavior in other
countries where it has acquired a wireless carrier. For example, since
Deutsche Telekom acquired One2One in the United Kingdom in August
1999,77 no complaints have been filed.
In addition, the German Telecommunications Act contains other
safeguards explicitly intended to prevent cross-subsidization between
74. REGULATORY AuTHORITY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTS, ANNUAL REPORT
2000, at 26, available at http://umts.regtp.de/en/marketlstartL/fs_15.htnl.
75. German 3G Winners Take Hit From Credit Rating Agency S&P, TELECOMM. REPS.
DAILY, Aug. 21, 2000, available at http:lwww.tr.comltronline/trd/2000/td082100/
td082100-02.htm (quoting analysts from Standard & Poor's).
76. German '3G' Spectrum Auction Tops U.K. Bidding Total by $10 Billion,
TELECOMM. REPS. DAILY, Aug. 21, 2000, available at http:llwww.tr.comonline/trd/2000/
td081700/Td081700-01.htm.
77. Press Release, Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Telekom Acquires One2One-
Position in Great Britain Significantly Strengthened-Major Step on One [of] the Most
Important Telecommunications Markets (Aug. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.dtag.de/dtag/presse/artikel/0,1018,x298,00.html.
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competitive and less competitive market segments. In particular, because
Deutsche Telekom is not subject to rate of return regulation, it cannot
cross-subsidize one division by misallocating its costs to another. The
inability to shift costs from one division to another severely undermines
Deutsche Telekom's opportunity to engage in predatory behavior.
2. Incentive to Engage in Predatory Behavior
The preceding analysis shows that Deutsche Telekom lacks the
opportunity to engage in predatory behavior in the U.S. wireless
telecommunications market. Deutsche Telekom also lacks the incentive to
engage in such conduct because, for at least four reasons, Deutsche
Telekom could never recoup predatory losses.
First, the likelihood of cross-subsidization and predatory pricing
grows increasingly implausible when one considers that the U.S. wireless
market that Deutsche Telekom enters through its acquisition of
VoiceStream has multiple incumbent suppliers with substantial capacity
and enormous financial resources. For example, as of August 28, 2001, the
combined market capitalization of AT&T Wireless ($39.7 billion),
BellSouth ($71 billion), Nextel ($9.5 billion), SBC Communications
($139.1 billion), Sprint PCS ($23.6 billion), and Verizon ($137 billion)
was $419.9 billion.7
Second, the acquisition of VoiceStream gives Deutsche Telekom only
about 3% of the wireless telecommunications customers in the United
States. Starting with such a low market share makes it all the more
implausible that Deutsche Telekom could capture a commanding market
share quickly enough to make a campaign of predatory losses
remunerative. Stated differently, Deutsche Telekom would need to capture
a significant share of the U.S. wireless market to make the eventual price
increase on "captured" customers profitable.
Third, the low average variable costs in the delivery of wireless
services further diminishes the prospect that predation would be attempted
by Deutsche Telekom or any other firm. Economic rationality will prevent
a firm from persistently pricing below average variable cost.79 When prices
do not allow for a competitive level of profit-that is, when total revenues
are less than total costs-a firm must confront the prospect of shutting
down operations. In particular, the firm should continue to operate in the
short run if and only if the loss incurred when the firm stays in business
78. Information obtained from Yahoo's web site http://biz.yahoo.com/ at close of
trading, Sept. 5, 2000.
79. See, e.g., WILLiAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND PoLiCy 216-17 (7th ed. 1997).
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(that is, total costs less total revenues) is less than the loss incurred when
the firm shuts down (that is, total costs less total variable costs). Hence, the
economic decision to remain in operation can be boiled down to the
following simple rule: Remain in operation so long as total variable cost is
less than total revenue. Because total cost and total revenue are divisible by
quantity produced (assuming a uniform price), the rule can be simplified
further: A firm would remain in operation so long as average variable cost
were less than price. If that condition were not met, the firm would
rationally choose to shut down operations. Stated differently, no rational
firm would choose to price below average variable cost if its sole objective
were maximizing its own profit. Because the majority of the costs in
developing a wireless network are fixed, the average variable costs for U.S.
wireless carriers are very low, relative to their respective prices. Hence, a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a successful predatory strategy
would be that Deutsche Telekom would force prices for wireless
telecommunications services to fall significantly.
The fourth reason that recoupment is impossible and predation
therefore implausible is the durability of spectrum. Spectrum does not wear
out and cannot be destroyed. It would therefore be impossible for Deutsche
Telekom to restrict industry output of wireless telecommunications services
and raise prices above incremental costs during the recoupment phase of
the predation scenario. Even in the unlikely event that Deutsche Telekom
could drive one of the large U.S. wireless incumbents into bankruptcy, the
bandwidth capacity of that carrier would remain intact, ready for another
firm to use (after a liquidation sale or FCC reassignment of licenses) and
immediately undercut Deutsche Telekom's noncompetitive prices.80 It is not
plausible that Deutsche Telekom could hoard the spectrum of competitors
that it had driven from the market because the FCC (if not also the federal
antitrust authorities) would first have to approve a transfer of the relevant
licenses from the failed competitors to Deutsche Telekom. In short, if
Deutsche Telekom were to attempt predatory pricing in the U.S. wireless
market, it could not expect to recoup its investment in sales made below
80. The FCC has recognized an analogous argument concerning the durability of fiber-
optic transmission capacity. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of
Sections 271 and 272 of the Comm. Act of 1934, as amended; and Reg. Treatment of LEC
Provision of Interexchange Servs. Originating in the LEC's Local Exchange Area, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,877, para. 137, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 2113, para.
137 (1996) (citing Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 25, 60 (1995); other citations omitted). See also J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F.
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 93-94 (1997) (making
same argument).
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incremental cost.81 The FCC expressly embraced this economic reasoning
82in its order approving Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream.
V. CONCLUSION
Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream was the first major
occasion for the FCC to consider the significance of partial foreign
government ownership for its public interest analysis of a proposed transfer
of license. Bond ratings and weighted average costs of capital reveal the-
implausibility of the hypothesis that Deutsche Telekom has the ability, by
virtue of its partial government ownership, to subsidize predatory pricing in
the U.S. wireless market. These data are consistent with the qualitative
insight that Deutsche Telekom must pursue profit maximization because at
least some of its shares are privately held and publicly traded.
Furthermore, Deutsche Telekom lacks the incentive to engage in
predatory conduct in the U.S. wireless market. Because of the inherent
durability of spectrum, Deutsche Telekom could never recoup predatory
losses incurred in the U.S. mobile telephony market-there would always
be competitors in the market. Moreover, the low average variable costs in
the delivery of wireless services make it all the more implausible that U.S.
carriers would exit the wireless telecommunications market in the face of
attempted predation by Deutsche Telekom. Because its expected losses
from engaging in predation would outweigh any expected gains, Deutsche
Telekom would not have an incentive to engage in predatory behavior.
As evidenced by the FCC's acceptance of it, the economic framework
presented in this Article fits neatly within procedures that exist to scrutinize
U.S. acquisitions by a company partially owned by a foreign government.
If legitimate concerns exist about the economic incentives of such an
acquiring firm, those concerns militate in favor of a thoughtful examination
of the issue in the public interest proceeding at the relevant regulatory
agency, such as the FCC, or in the merger review proceeding at the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") or the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
81. For similar skepticism of the plausibility of predatory pricing in the U.S.
telecommunications market, see PAUL W. MACAvOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REG-
ULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 186-90
(1996); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Competitive Effects of Line-of-Business Restrictions in
Telecommunications, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 301 (1995); Paul S. Brandon &
Richard L. Schmalensee, The Benefits of Releasing the Bell Companies from the
Interexchange Restrictions, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 349 (1995); Susan Gates et
al., Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business Restraints Needed?,
16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 427 (1995); Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in Long-
Distance and Telecommunications Markets: Effects of the MFJ, 16 MANAGEPIAL &
DECISION ECON. 365 (1995).
82. See Deutsche Telekom Order, supra note 3, para. 90.
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In addition, there remains a powerful incentive for private companies to use
the antitrust law and the Telecommunications Act to challenge mergers, for
both noble reasons and selfish ones. New legislation to regulate foreign
government investment in American telecommunications is therefore
unnecessary to protect the interests of either U.S. consumers or U.S.
producers. The existing review processes at the FCC and the DOJ (or FTC)
already have at their disposal, and use, sophisticated economic analysis to
evaluate the public interest implications of acquisitions by partially
privatized firms.
